A-LEVEL PHILOSOPHY · AQA 7172 · PAPER 2Harlington School · Philosophy · Metaphysics of Mind

Dualist theories: substance dualism, property dualism and their issues

Kind one: the mind is a separate THING. Kind two: the brain has extra PROPERTIES. Both say physics leaves something out.

The
big
question

Is the mind a separate non-physical thing, or a set of non-physical properties of the brain — and, if either, how can we know other minds and how can mind move matter?

How it is examined: five questions — 3 · 5 · 5 · 12 · 25 marks. The Year 12 December test is Q01–Q04; the 25-mark essay is the Year 13 stretch. This unit's ladder ↓
02

The dualism line

The unit's positions, lined up. Tap a position to see what it claims and where it is strong or weak. If you can order them, you understand them.

TWO THINGS · the mind is a separate thing that could exist without the body (Descartes)ONE THING · only some properties of experience go beyond the physical (Chalmers)

Tap a circle — or use Tab and Enter — to explore each position.

The thread that ties it together

This map lesson sets out the two kinds of dualism and the two problems they face. The next six lessons test them one by one: no parts, mind without body, zombies, the colour scientist, other minds, and mind moving body.

◀ Refer back · The mind–body problem: the hard problem and the map of theories
Why is consciousness so hard to explain, and what are the main theories of how mind relates to body?

Unit 1 ended with the hard problem: why does brain activity FEEL like anything? Dualism gives the oldest answer: the mind is not wholly physical.

Retrieve: Predict: does the hard problem help kind one (a separate THING) or kind two (extra PROPERTIES) more? Write one reason.
The big idea

Going from left to right, the dualist claims less and less — and faces fewer problems. But the further right you go, the closer you come to physicalism, or to a mind that does nothing at all.

Look ahead · Substance dualism: the indivisibility argument ▶
Does the fact that the mind has no parts show that it cannot be the body?

Next lesson tests Descartes' first argument: does the mind really have no parts? And can the body always be cut up?

Prime: Try to imagine your mind split in two. Write down exactly what you cannot imagine, and why.
01

The lessons in this unit

7 lessons, taught in this order. The first is the map of the whole unit — this page mirrors it — and each lesson after it takes one part deeper. Timetabled for Track A · Autumn 1 (W2–7). See the whole year plan ↗

Lesson 1 · week 2

The map: is the mind something over and above the body?

Substance and property dualism, their four arguments, and the issues they face: other minds, interaction, epiphenomenalism.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 2 · week 2

Substance dualism: the indivisibility argument

Descartes' argument and Leibniz's law; the mental is divisible in some sense; not everything physical is divisible; the unity of consciousness.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 3 · week 3

Substance dualism: the conceivability argument

Clear and distinct conception; mind without body not conceivable; conceivable is not always possible (Arnauld); possible tells us nothing about actual.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 4 · week 4

Property dualism: philosophical zombies

Chalmers' zombie argument; a zombie world is not conceivable; conceivability and a posteriori necessity; possible but not actual.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 5 · week 5

Property dualism: the knowledge argument (Mary)

Jackson's Mary; ability and acquaintance knowledge; new concept, old fact; Dennett's blue banana and the denial of qualia.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 6 · week 6

Issues facing dualism: the problem of other minds

The epistemological problem; Mill's argument from analogy and its criticisms; the best hypothesis; the conceptual problem.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
Lesson 7 · week 7

Interaction and epiphenomenalism

Elisabeth's conceptual interaction problem; conservation of energy and causal closure; Huxley's epiphenomenalism and its four issues.

Lesson deck ↗ Booklet ↗ Podcast ♪
03

Two dualisms and two problems, side by side

Two kinds of thing, or one thing with two sides? But dualists deny that the physical is the WHOLE story. Something about the mind — your thinking, or what it FEELS like to see red or to be in pain — is left out of every physical description. That leftover is not physical. Dualism comes in two kinds. Kind one: substance dualism — the mind is a separate THING that could exist without the body (Descartes). Kind two: property dualism — there is only one thing, the brain, but it has extra PROPERTIES that physics cannot explain (Chalmers, Jackson). Both kinds then face two hard questions: how do I know anyone else has a mind? And how can a mind move a body?

Kind one

Substance dualism: Descartes

The mind is a separate THING from the body: it thinks, takes up no space, and could exist without the body.
1A substance is a thing that can exist on its own. The mind is one substance; the body is another.
2The mind thinks and takes up no space. The body takes up space and does not think.
3The mind has no parts, but the body does. By Leibniz's law, one difference means two things.
4So the mind could exist without the body — for example, it could survive death.
Strength It fits how the mind feels from the inside: one whole 'I', with no parts. And it explains why the mind seems so unlike anything in physics.
Weakness Nobody can check an out-of-body report — it may be a dream. And brain damage, drugs and sleep all change the mind. If the mind is a separate thing, why does it depend so much on the brain?
Kind two

Property dualism: irreducible properties

One thing, the brain — but with extra PROPERTIES, like the look of red, that physics cannot explain.
1There is only one kind of thing in the world: physical stuff. There is no separate soul.
2But the brain has mental properties, like what pain feels like. These felt qualities are called qualia.
3Qualia are irreducible: the brain's physical properties cannot explain them.
4Two arguments: Chalmers' zombies, and Jackson's scientist who first sees red. Both say physics leaves something out.
Strength It keeps the science: one physical world, and minds made by brains. But it still takes the hard problem seriously: why brain activity FEELS like anything at all.
Weakness If the extra properties make no physical difference, they seem to do nothing — the road to epiphenomenalism. And physicalists say a full brain science might explain the look of red after all.
The problem both face

The problem of other minds

If minds are private, I only ever see other people's bodies and actions — so how do I know anyone else has a mind?
1I can look into my own mind. In other people, I can only see bodies and actions.
2Mill: others have bodies like mine and act as I do when I feel things. So they probably feel things too.
3The problem: Mill's argument rests on one case — mine — and nobody can ever check it.
4Best explanation: minds explain how people act, as atoms explain chemistry. So belief in other minds is reasonable.
Strength It shows a real cost of dualism: the more private the mind, the harder it is to know that anyone else has one.
Weakness The best-explanation reply may answer it. And physicalists face a version of the same problem: how do I know what someone else's experience is like?
The challenge

Interaction or epiphenomenalism?

Interactionism: mind and body move each other. Epiphenomenalism: the brain makes the mind, but the mind moves nothing.
1Elisabeth of Bohemia: to cause movement, things must touch. The mind has no surface — so how can it move a body?
2Science: every physical event has a physical cause, and energy is never added. A mind moving an arm would add energy.
3Epiphenomenalism: the brain causes the mind, but the mind causes nothing physical. Huxley: a steam whistle.
4The cost: then pain never makes you wince — and you could not even SAY that you are in pain.
Strength It presses where dualism is weakest: the plain, everyday fact that our thoughts seem to cause our actions.
Weakness Even in physics, nobody fully understands what causing is. So the dualist may say: you cannot demand a mechanism for mind moving body.
04

Six cases that pull us towards or away from dualism

Every position in this unit is tested on cases. Read each one, decide what you would say, then tap for the question the examiners would ask.

05

Talk it through — four moves

Say it before you write it. Four moves, with the sentence stems the examiners are listening for in your essay — connect, challenge, weigh, reason from cases.

Connect
“This connects to … because …”
“That is the same move as … made in …”
This unit · Put the out-of-body report next to the scientist who sees red. Both say physics leaves something out. Say what is DIFFERENT: what is left out in each — a thing, or a property?
Challenge
“The weakest step is … because …”
“That only follows if … — and it might not.”
This unit · Argue this: property dualism is just substance dualism with better manners. It still says something is not physical, and science still cannot reach it. Agree or disagree?
Weigh
“Even granting …, … — so on balance …”
“The cost of that reply is …”
This unit · Which is worse for a dualist: not being able to say how the mind moves the body, or saying the mind moves nothing at all? Give one reason.
Reason from cases
“In case A …; in B …; so in general …”
“The case that breaks the pattern is …”
This unit · Go through the six cases. For each one say: does it point to a separate THING, to extra PROPERTIES, or to no dualism at all? Then find the case that is hardest to place.
Protocol Pairs 2 min → fours 3 min → two speakers to the front. Roles: Proposer · Challenger · Judge · Reporter. Rule: every reply begins by restating what you heard. · 8 min
06

The exam ladder — this unit's mock

Five rungs, one per question type. Open a rung for the shape a full answer takes and this unit's plan, then write. Everyone climbs Q01–Q04; Q05 is the stretch.

Q013 marks · Define
What is property dualism?SHAPE One precise sentence a philosopher would accept
The shape of a full answer
  1. One precise sentence
  2. A contrast or example if it earns clarity
  3. No evaluation, no history — stop
Your plan — this unit
  1. The view that there is only one kind of substance, but some of its properties — mental properties such as qualia — are non-physical and irreducible to physical properties.
Write it — about 2 lines
0 words · nothing here is saved — copy it into your book
Q025 marks · Outline
Outline Descartes' indivisibility argument for substance dualism.SHAPE Every part the specification names, in order
The shape of a full answer
  1. State the view or distinction in full
  2. Use the technical vocabulary exactly
  3. Order it: claim → the parts → what follows
Your plan — this unit
  1. The mind is indivisible: the same 'I' wills, doubts, perceives
  2. The body is divisible
  3. By Leibniz's law, one difference shows they are not identical.
Write it — about 4 lines
0 words · nothing here is saved — copy it into your book
Q035 marks · Explain
Explain the problem of other minds for dualism.SHAPE Set-up → premises → conclusion
The shape of a full answer
  1. Set-up: name the target — which view, which claim
  2. Premises: state them in order, numbered
  3. Conclusion: show it follows, and what it costs
Your plan — this unit
  1. If minds are private and non-physical, I observe only bodies and behaviour
  2. Any belief in other minds is an inference that cannot be directly checked.
Write it — about 5 lines
0 words · nothing here is saved — copy it into your book
Q0412 marks · Explain
Explain how substance dualism differs from property dualism, and explain one issue facing each.SHAPE Two linked explanations, both full
The shape of a full answer
  1. Part A: the view or argument, in full
  2. Part B: the issue or reply, with its own premises and conclusion
  3. The link: one sentence on what B does to A
  4. Mostly AO1 — explain, do not judge; the verdict waits for the essay
Your plan — this unit
  1. Substance: two substances, mind could exist alone (Descartes)
  2. Property: one substance, irreducible mental properties (Chalmers)
  3. Issues: interaction
  4. Epiphenomenalism.
Write it — about 8 lines
0 words · nothing here is saved — copy it into your book
Q0525 marks · Evaluate
Is dualism true?SHAPE A sustained argument to a judgement
The shape of a full answer
  1. Introduction: define the term, state your thesis, name the positions you will test
  2. Each paragraph: state the argument · test it with the strongest objection · reply · WEIGH
  3. One shared case, run through every position
  4. Judgement: what survives, and what the losing views cannot explain
Your plan — this unit
  1. Thesis
  2. Define both dualisms
  3. The arguments (indivisibility, conceivability, zombies, Mary)
  4. The issues (other minds, interaction, epiphenomenalism)
  5. Judgement.
Write it — about 10 lines to plan, then the essay in your book
0 words · nothing here is saved — copy it into your book
Beyond the ladder: This unit weighs four arguments for dualism against two sets of issues. Predict which single argument will survive its objections best, and which issue will do the most damage.
07

Your resources

Everything for the unit, in one place. The lesson, the booklet and the podcast belong to this unit; the Metaphysics of Mind booklets runs across the whole series.

Teacher setup: links aren't set yet. Open this file, find the LINKS list near the bottom, and paste each SharePoint share link once. Buttons with no link show as "Link not set".
08

How to revise this unit

Use the resources in this order. The Metaphysics of Mind booklets is where you learn to plan all five question types.

Listen to the podcast, then read the transcript

A teacher and a student argue every position through to a judgement. Pause at each position and say what it claims before they do.

Complete the booklet

Given text on the left, your words on the right. Decide the strength and the weakness YOU would give each position.

Flip the flashcards until every term is one sentence

Key terms first, then the positions. A term you cannot define in one sentence is a Q01 you cannot yet answer.

Climb the ladder: Q01 to Q04 from a plan

Precision questions. Open each rung, plan from the shape, write, then check every part the specification names is there.

Plan Q05 with one shared case

In the Companion: Part 4, the Q05 planning frame. Plan today's Q05 — thesis, the two dualisms, their arguments, the issues, judgement.

Q01–Q04 · 3, 5, 5 and 12 marks · precision
Q01 Define — one precise sentence a philosopher would accept. No evaluation, no history.
Q02 Outline — every part the specification names, in order, in the technical vocabulary.
Q03 Explain — set-up, premises in order, conclusion — and what it costs the target.
Q04 Explain … and … — two full explanations and the one sentence that links them. Still AO1: explain, do not judge.
Q05 · 25 marks · AO2 is 20 of them
What it is — a sustained argument to a judgement. Every paragraph states an argument, tests it, replies, and WEIGHS.
Aim — AO1 is saying each kind of dualism clearly, with its case. AO2 is asking: does this problem hit both kinds, or only one — and why?
09

Watch

Descartes' substance dualism — watch for substance dualism for AQA — Sally Latham, 20:39

10

Flashcards — test yourself

Flip a card to check yourself. Switch between key terms (term → meaning) and positions (position → claim, strength & weakness).

Tap any card to flip ·
11

Exit ticket

Three things to recall, one to argue. Answer them in your book before you leave the unit.

Recall

  1. Say the difference between substance dualism and property dualism.
  2. Name the two arguments for each kind of dualism.
  3. Name the two answers to how mind and body are linked: interactionism and epiphenomenalism.

Challenge

Argue: Which kind of dualism do you think is stronger — and which problem hits it hardest?

AO1 vs AO2 AO1 is saying each kind of dualism clearly, with its case. AO2 is asking: does this problem hit both kinds, or only one — and why?